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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Corwin was tried by a jury and found guilty of driving under the influence. 
Following a bench trial, he was also found guilty of the felony enhancements alleged by 
the State. Although the district court ordered that a substance abuse evaluation be 
performed for purposes of sentencing, no such evaluation was ever received. The 
district court sentenced Mr. Corwin to ?O years, with five years fixed. 
Mr. Corwin timely appeals, and asserts that the district court improperly admitted 
opinion testimony from two law enforcement officers that invaded the province of the 
jury because this testimony embraced the ultimate question of Mr. Corwin's guilt of the 
charged offense. He further asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct that rose 
to the level of fundamental error when she expressed her personal opinion of 
Mr. Corwin's guilt during closing argument. Finally, Mr. Corwin asserts that the district 
court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 when it sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit 
of the substance abuse evaluation that was ordered in this case and required by statute, 
and further abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Corwin's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting that such an evaluation be performed. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In early June of 2007, Stephanie Lane, Julian Agirre, and Kenneth Seward were 
all traveling westbound on highway 1-84 between Nampa and Caldwell. (Part I Trial 
~ r . ' ,  p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.20; p.53, L . l l  - p.54, L.4; p.64, Ls.3-21.) They were driving at 
approximately 9:00 p.m., but the sun was just beginning to set and there was still some 
daylight illuminating the road. (Part I Trial Tr., p.38, Ls.12-14; p.43, Ls.10-18.) 
While traveling at approximately 70 miles per hour, Ms. Lane looked in her 
rearview mirror and saw a white car approaching at a high rate of speed. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.29, Ls.21-24; p.38, Ls.22-24.) She was in the passing lane at the time, and there 
was a truck in the right-hand lane next to her. (Part I Trial Tr., p.30, Ls.3-10.) Ms. Lane 
testified at trial that she was able to observe that the driver of the car was a white male 
with dark hair. (Part I Trial Tr., p.31, L.14 - p.32, L.10.) However, she did not indicate 
in her statement to police many of the driver's features that she would later testify to at 
trial. (Part I Trial Tr., p.41, L.16 - p.42, L.14.) 
Ms. Lane then sped up so that she could change lanes and get out of the 
speeding car's way. (Part I Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.16-23.) Believing that the driver behind 
her had rear-ended her car, she also pulled over to the side of the road after moving out 
of the passing lane. (Part I Trial Tr., p.33, Ls.13-19.) Shortly after Ms. Lane pulled off 
the highway, she observed the white car spin and flip over onto the median. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.33, Ls.20-23.) The white car eventually came to rest upside-down on the highway 
median. (Part I Trial Tr., p.34, Ls.9-12.) 
Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for 
ease of reference, citations to the transcript will be made according to the nature of the 
proceeding. The transcripts for the jury trial for Part I of the State's Information, held on 
October 23 and 24, 2007; and the sentencing hearing held on January 2, 2008; are 
contained in the same volume of transcripts of proceedings but have independent page 
numbers. The transcript of proceedings of the bench trial for Parts II and Ill of the 
State's Information, held on October 25, 2007, is contained in a separate volume. 
Mr. Agirre also observed the white car shortly before the driver lost control of that 
car. (Part I Trial Tr., p.53. L . l l  - p.56, L.4.) The white car passed Mr. Agirre and cut in 
front of him before spinning out. (Part I Trial Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.56, L.18.) Mr. Agirre 
never saw the driver of the car, could not tell whether the driver was male or female, 
and never saw any person exit the car and leave the scene. (Part I Trial Tr., p.55, 
Ls.17-23; p.59, Ls.23-24.) 
As with Ms. Lane and Mr. Agirre, Mr. Seward was passed by the white car before 
it spun out and flipped onto its roof on the median. (Part I Trial Tr., p.65, L.16 - p.68, 
L.7.) Mr. Seward was driving at approximately 80 miles per hour when the white car 
passed him. (Part I Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.2-4.) Although his view of the driver was 
obscured by the driver's ballcap, Mr. Seward testified that the car was being driven by a 
white male. (Part I Trial Tr., p.66, L.13 - p.67, L.6; p.77, Ls.20-22.) 
After the white car came to rest in the median, Ms. Lane saw a man in jeans and 
a tee shirt crossing to the opposite side of the highway from the area of the car. (Part I 
Trial Tr., p.36, L.16 - p.38, L. l l .)  Mr. Seward called 911 to report the accident. (Part I 
Trial Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.5.) 
When law enforcement arrived at the scene of the accident, there were several 
people who had pulled over to the side of the road but the driver of the white car was no 
longer at the scene. (Part I Trial Tr., p.84, Ls.11-19; p.85, Ls.5-15.) Officer Anthony 
Pittz, who was first on the scene, stated that there was an odor of an alcoholic beverage 
coming from the inside of the car and amber-colored liquid dripping out of it. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.80, L.5 - p.87, L.18.) He also testified that he saw beer cans near the outside of 
the car, but didn't see any beer cans in the car's interior. (Part I Trial Tr., p.87, L.19 - 
p.88, L.1.) 
After talking to witnesses, Officer Pittz crossed to the far side of the highway to 
look for the person who had been seen leaving the white car after it had come to rest on 
its top. (Part I Trial Tr., p.88, L.16 - p.89, L.1.) He saw Mr. Corwin standing behind a 
bush in the adjacent field. (Part I Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.4-19; p.97, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Corwin was 
talking on a cellular phone when Officer Pittz asked to speak to him. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p.91, Ls.3-4.) Although Mr. Corwin initially continued to speak on the phone while 
approaching the officer, he hung up when Officer Pittz requested that he do so. (Part I 
Trial Tr., p.91, Ls.11-17.) 
The officer testified that Mr. Corwin had what appeared to be blood on his tee 
shirt but that Mr. Corwin initially denied any knowledge of the accident. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p.91, L.15 - p.92, L.4.) Officer Pittz then handcuffed Mr. Corwin and led him back 
towards the scene of the accident. (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, Ls.4-11.) According to the 
officer, Mr. Corwin's breath smelled of alcohol and his eyes were "glassy and 
bloodshot." (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.95, L.14.) Additional law enforcement 
officers arrived shortly after Officer Pittz brought Mr. Corwin to the accident scene. 
(Part ITrialTr., p.114, L.23-p.115, L.13.) 
Trooper Deshan Cabaong responded to the scene of the accident and 
interrogated Mr. Corwin. (Part I Trial Tr., p.150, L.7 - p.151, L.12; p.163, L.12 - p.164, 
L.lO.) As he was investigating the scene, Trooper Cabaong saw an empty box of 
Busch beer and a Budweiser beer can lying in the median near the overturned car. 
(Part I Trial Tr., p.157, Ls.6-16; 261, Ls.18-25; Exhibit 2.) Although he didn't see any 
liquid substance inside of the car, the trooper smelled alcohol when he was examining 
the inside of the white car. (Part I Trial Tr., p.159, L.17 - p.160, L.6.) Mr. Corwin 
maintained throughout his questioning by the officer that he was not the person who 
was driving the white car; and that his girlfriend, Sunday Bender, was the driver. (Part I 
Trial Tr., p.169, L.24-p.170, L.9; p.186, Ls.10-20.) 
Mr. Corwin was arrested for driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI).~ (R., 
pp.4, 32-35.) Upon being arrested and transported to the jail, Mr. Corwin refused to 
submit to a breath test. (Part I Trial Tr., p. 187, L.9 - p. 194, L.4.) He was charged with 
felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.32-35.) The State alleged that Mr. Corwin 
had twice been previously convicted of driving under the influence within the previous 
ten years, and therefore his alleged act of driving under the influence should be 
elevated to a felony charge pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5). (R., pp.32-35.) Mr. Corwin 
was also charged by information with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.57-58.) 
At trial, Ms. Lane, Mr. Agirre, and Mr. Seward all testified about their 
observations of the white car's movements immediately preceding the accident. (Part I 
Trial Tr., p.28, L.18 - p.78, L.15.) Ms. Lane identified Mr. Corwin as the driver of the 
white car. (Part I Trial Tr., p.33, Ls.3-12.) The State also presented the testimony of 
several law enforcement officers who were present following the crash. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p.80, L.5 - p.273, L.25.) 
As noted, Officer Pittz testified that, upon encountering Mr. Corwin in a field 
adjacent to the highway, he detected the smell of an alcoholic beverage on Mr. Corwin's 
Mr. Corwin was also charged with the misdemeanor offense of leaving the scene of a 
property damage accident, but was ultimately acquitted of this offense by the district 
court. (Parts Il & Ill Trial Tr., p.50, Ls.14-22.) 
breath, and Mr. Corwin's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 - 
p.95, L.14.) The officer testified that both of these were indications that the person is 
under the influence of alcohol. (Part I Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.3-14.) But Officer Pittz did not 
detect any difficulty in Mr. Corwin's speech and could not detect any difficulty in his 
movements other than those normally found when a person is handcuffed. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.96, Ls.15-25.) 
The prosecutor then asked, over Mr. Corwin's objection, whether Officer Pittz 
believed that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated based upon the officer's "training and 
experience." (Part I Trial Tr., p.lOO, Ls.8-13.) The district court overruled Mr. Corwin's 
objection and permitted Officer Pittz to testify that he did believe that Mr. Corwin was 
intoxicated. (Part I Trial Tr., p.lOO, Ls.13-14.) 
The State also presented the testimony of Trooper Cabaong. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p.142, Ls.10-15.) The officer testified as to his observations of the empty beer box and 
beer can near where the white car had come to rest in the median. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p. 157, Ls.6-16; p.261, Ls. 1 8-25.) He also testified that, during his questioning of 
Mr. Corwin, the officer smelled alcohol on his breath, Mr. Corwin's eyes were bloodshot, 
and his movements during the interrogation were shaky. (Part I Trial Tr., p.165, L.7 - 
p.166, L.22.) The officer also thought that Mr. Corwin was unsteady when he was 
asked to perform the single field sobriety test that the trooper administered. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.175, L.23 - p.176, L.l; p.178, Ls.21-25.) When he was transported to jail, the 
trooper believed that Mr. Corwin was being argumentative with the officer. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.167, L.22-p.168, L.23.) 
When asked if he was driving the car, Mr. Corwin informed the officer he had 
been drinking, but that his girlfriend, Ms. Bender, was driving. (Part I Trial Tr., p.169, 
L.24 - p. 170, L.9; p.186, Ls.10-20.) According to Mr. Corwin's description, Ms. Bender 
is a petite red-haired woman. (Part I Trial Tr., p.170 Ls.10-15.) Although the trooper 
had no recollection of whether Mr. Cowin had provided any contact information for 
Ms. Bender, the officer testified that he never located or questioned her about the 
accident. (Part I Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.16-22.) Trooper Cabaong did not believe that the 
position of the driver's seat of the white car was consistent with someone of 
Ms. Bender's height of five feet tall. (Part I Trial Tr., p.173, Ls.13-25.) 
As with Officer Pittz, the prosecutor asked Trooper Cabaong whether he had 
concluded that Mr. Corwin was under the influence of alcohol based on the officer's 
training and experience. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.3-8.) The officer responded that this 
was his conclusion. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.6-8.) Over Mr. Corwin's objection, when 
asked a second time whether the officer believed that Mr. Corwin was legally too 
impaired to drive, the trooper again responded that this was his conclusion. (Part I Trial 
Tr., p.196, L.15 - p.197, L.3.) Trooper Cabaong also informed the jury that Mr. Corwin 
refused to take a breath test after being arrested. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, L.9 - p.194, 
L.4.) 
On cross-examination, Trooper Cabaong acknowledged that Mr. Corwin had 
consistently maintained that Ms. Bender was the person who had been driving on the 
night of the accident. (Part I Trial Tr., p.210, L.2 - p.211, L.2.) He also testified that 
there was no way of determining how long the empty beer box or the beer can had been 
present on the median next to the white car and that the officer never asked Mr. Corwin 
how much he had to drink or how long before the accident he had consumed alcohol. 
(Part1 TrialTr., p.214, L.20-p.216, L.14; p.262, Ls.1-13.) 
Mr. Corwin was found guilty by the jury of driving under the influence. (R., p.99.) 
He waived his right to a jury trial as to Parts II and Ill of the State's Information, which 
alleged that he had two prior DUI convictions and that he was a persistent violator, and 
proceeded to a bench trial on these allegations. (Part I Trial Tr., p.3, L.16 - p.5, L.6; R., 
pp.34-35, 66-67, 98.) At this bench trial, the State informed the district court that it was 
moving to dismiss Part Ill of the information, alleging that Mr. Corwin was a persistent 
violator, because the State lacked sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Corwin's prior 
offenses as required under I.C. 5 19-2514. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.41, L.22 - p.42, 
L.9.) The district court granted the State's motion and dismissed the persistent violator 
allegation. (Parts Il & Ill Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.12-16.) 
However, upon hearing the State's evidence, the district court found that the 
State had established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Corwin had two prior 
violations, one pursuant to I.C. 5 18-8004 and one under what the district court found 
was a substantially conforming statute out of Washington State. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., 
p.39, L.8 - p.41, L.lO.) Therefore, the district court found Mr. Corwin guilty of the felony 
enhancements alleged in Part I1 of the State's Information. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.41, 
Ls.7-1 I .)
After indicating its intent to order a presentence evaluation report, the district 
court asked the parties whether this was "an appropriate case to have an alcohol 
evaluation." (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.10-I 1 .) The State indicated that it was, and 
Mr. Corwin raised no objection. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, L.12.) The district court 
then stated, "I think that would be required. I will order an alcohol evaluation to be 
prepared." (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.13-15.) The district court then asked 
Mr. Corwin whether he wished to use his own evaluator for the evaluation, to which 
Mr. Corwin indicated that the evaluator normally used by the county was acceptable. 
(Parts Il & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.16-21.) 
While the district court ordered this evaluation on the record, there appears to be 
no separate written order for this evaluation entered by the district court. (R., p.3.) 
However, the district court's Notice of Order for Presentence Report contains an order 
for a drug and alcohol evaluation. (R., p.105.) Despite this fact, no drug and alcohol 
evaluation appears to have been performed in this case. 
Mr. Corwin received a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, for 
felony DUI. (Sentencing Tr., p.15, Ls.9-16; R., pp.113-114.) He was also ordered to 
pay $112.50 for restitution and a fine of $2,000, and his driving privileges were 
suspended for five years, commencing upon his release from incarceration. 
(Sentencing Tr., p.15, L.24-p.16, L.4; R., pp.113-114.) 
Acting pro se, Mr. Corwin then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his 
sentence. (R., pp.127-130.) In this motion, Mr. Corwin asserted, inter alia, that a 
substance abuse evaluation should have been ordered in his case for purposes of 
sentencing. (R., p.127.) He further asserted that, had such evaluation been prepared 
for sentencing, it would have revealed mitigating evidence that likely would have 
resulted in a lower sentence. (R., p.127.) Mr. Corwin also acknowledged that he 
suffered from substance abuse problems and that he accepted responsibility for the 
harms that his addiction had caused. (R., p.127.) He further brought to the district 
court's attention the fact that he had previously mentioned the failure to perform the 
substance abuse evaluation that the district court ordered in his PSI. (R., p.129; PSI, 
p. 13.) 
The State objected to Mr. Corwin's request for leniency regarding his sentence, 
and his implicit request for a substance abuse evaluation, based upon its assertion that 
Mr. Corwin had not presented new and additional information. (R., pp.131-132.) 
The district court denied Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (R., 
pp.133-138.) In doing so, the district court identified the following bases from Mr. 
Corwin's Rule 35 motion as supporting his request for leniency: (1) rehabilitation; (2) 
alleged errors in the PSI regarding his criminal history; and (3) the fact that no one was 
injured as a result of his offense. (R., p.135.) The district court failed to acknowledge in 
any way Mr. Corwin's claims that a substance abuse evaluation should have been 
performed in his case in aid of sentencing. (R., pp.133-138.) However, the district court 
did note that it was aware of Mr. Corwin's "significant drug and alcohol issues." (R., 
p.136.) 
Mr. Corwin timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's judgment and 
commitment. (R., pp.113-I 17.) 
ISSUE 
1. Did the State's questions regarding whether law enforcement officers believed 
that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated impermissibly invade the province of the jury? 
2. Did the prosecutor's closing remarks at sentencing regarding the prosecutor's 
personal belief in the guilt of the defendant constitute prosecutorial misconduct? 
3. Did the district court manifest disregard I.C.R. 32 when it sentenced Mr. Corwin 
without the benefit of the substance abuse evaluation that was ordered for 
purposes of sentencing, and further abuse its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion that requested such evaluation be actually 
performed? 
ARGUMENT 
The State's Questions Reaardina Whether Law Enforcement Officers Believed That 
Mr. Corwin Was lntoxicated lmoermissibly lnvaded The Province Of The Jury 
A. Introduction 
In this case, the district court permitted law enforcement officers to repeatedly 
testify, over Mr. Corwin's objections, as to the ultimate issue for the jury's determination: 
whether Mr. Corwin was driving under the influence of alcohol. The prosecutor elicited 
these opinions as expert testimony and emphasized the officer's conclusions during 
closing arguments. Because the issue of whether Mr. Corwin was under the influence 
of alcohol was a finding solely for the jury to determine, and because the officer's 
statements were not of value to assist the trier of fact on this issue as it was within the 
jury's ability to evaluate the circumstantial evidence on its own, admission of this 
testimony was error that prejudiced Mr. Corwin's right to a jury trial. 
B. The State's Questions Reqarding Whether Law Enforcement Officers Believed 
That Mr. Corwin Was lntoxicated lmpermissiblv lnvaded The Province Of The 
Jun/ 
Expert witnesses may testify in the form of an opinion provided that: (1) they are 
properly qualified as an expert by their knowledge, skill, experience, or training; and 
(2) their specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. Idaho Rule of Evidence 704 also provides that 
opinion testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact." I.R.E. 704. 
However, ldaho case law consistently recognizes that the provisions of I.R.E. 
704, which permits opinion testimony that embraces an ultimate issue, must be read in 
conjunction with I.R.E. 702. See, e.g., State v. Hester, 114 ldaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 
27, 35 (1988). Specifically, where the expert opinion testimony only serves to 
"impermissibly evaluate the circumstances and render the same conclusion the jury was 
asked to render by its verdict," then such testimony is improperly admitted. Id.; see also 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho 758, 768, 864 P.2d 596, 606 (1993); State v. Johnson, 
119 ldaho 852,855,810 P.2d 1138,1141 (1991). 
The Court in Hester adopted the following language and reasoning of the Kansas 
Supreme Court in State v. Lash, 699 P.2d 49 (Kan. 1985): 
[Tlhe opinion testimony of experts on the ultimate issue or issues is not 
admissible without limitations. Such testimony is admissible only insofar 
as the opinion will aid the jury in the interpretation of technical facts or 
when it will assist the jury in understanding the material in evidence. ... 
Where the normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors permit them 
to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances, expert 
conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. 
Hester, 114 ldaho at 696, 760 P.2d at 35 (internal citation omitted). 
Where an expert testifies as to his or her opinion as to an ultimate issue in a 
case, and where such testimony is not based on specialized experience and training 
such that a lay juror could not be expected to meaningful interpret the evidence on his 
own, this testimony impermissibly invades on the province of the jury and should not be 
admitted. Id. Admission of expert testimony that invades the province of the jury 
constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to a jury triaL3 See State v. Walters, 120 
ldaho 46,48, 813 P.2d 857, 859 (1991). 
The prosecutor in this case elicited testimony from Officer Pittz and Trooper 
Cabaong that specifically called on these officers, based on their specialized training 
and experience, to render an expert opinion as to the whether Mr. Corwin was legally 
intoxicated. With regard to Officer Pittz, the prosecutor asked, "Based on your training 
and your experience did you believe Mr. Corwin to be under the influence of alcohol?" 
(Part I Trial Tr., p.lOO, Ls.8-14.) Over Mr. Corwin's objection, the officer was permitted 
to answer that this was his belief. (Part I Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.11-14.) 
Trooper Cabaong was asked similar questions by the prosecutor twice during his 
testimony. When asked why the trooper transported Mr. Corwin to jail, the trooper 
answered, "[blecause I determined that he was under the influence of alcohol and under 
arrest." (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-5.) The prosecutor followed up by asking whether 
the officer reached that conclusion based upon his training and experience, to which the 
officer replied in the affirmative. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.6-8.) 
Later on in Trooper Cabaong's testimony, the prosecutor again asked for a 
conclusion regarding "Mr. Corwin and his ability to successfully operate a motor 
vehicle." (Part I Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.15-20.) Over Mr. Corwin's objection, the officer was 
permitted to testify that he believed that Mr. Corwin was too impaired to operate a motor 
vehicle. (Part I Trial Tr., p.196, L.21 - p.197, L.3.) 
Both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the ldaho 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury. See, e.g., State 
v. Stover, 140 ldaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005). 
This testimony went to the ultimate determination that the jury was called upon to 
render in this case: whether Mr. Corwin was driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
The officers' testimony, as elicited by the prosecutor, mirrored precisely the language 
used by both the relevant statute and case law as the core definition of the offense. 
The core prohibition of I.C. 9 18-8004 is against persons who are under the 
influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances having actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle. The testimony of both officers parroted the language of the statute when 
expressing their opinions at trial. (Part I Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.8-14; p.187, Ls.3-8.) 
Additionally, the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding whether Trooper Cabaong 
thought that Mr. Corwin was impaired and whether his consumption of alcohol affected 
his ability to operate a motor vehicle. (Part I Trial Tr., p.196, L.15 - p.197, L.3.) This 
language has been consistently applied in relevant case law as definitive of being under 
the influence of alcohol for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Mace, 133 
ldaho 903, 905, 994 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct. App. 2000); Sfafe v. Bronnenberg, 124 ldaho 
67, 70, 856 P.2d 104, 107 (Ct. App. 1993); Sfafe v. Andrus, I18  ldaho 711, 715, 800 
P.2d 107, 11 1 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, the expert testimony of the officers in this case regarding whether 
Mr. Corwin was, in their opinion, intoxicated, impaired, or incapable of driving safely 
impermissibly invaded the province of the jury. This testimony not only embraced a 
conclusion that was well within the abilities of the jurors to evaluate for themselves, but 
the testimony was, in effect, an expression of the officer's opinion as to the ultimate 
issue of Mr. Corwin's guilt. Admission of this testimony over Mr. Corwin's objections 
was error. 
While there appears to be no case law in ldaho directly addressing this issue, the 
ldaho Court of Appeals has discussed the subtle, but real, distinction between testimony 
from a law enforcement officer that a defendant's behavior is consistent with 
intoxication, and testimony that the officer believes the defendant was actually 
intoxicated. State v. Burrow, 142 ldaho 328, 331, 127 P.3d 231, 234 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Addressing the issue of the witness' qualifications as an expert, the Burrows court 
noted: 
Here, the officer did not render an opinion that Burrow was under the 
influence of drugs but, rather, that he displayed certain symptoms that are 
consistent with those shown by persons who are under the influence of 
methamphetamine and similar substances. While this distinction may be 
subtle, it is nevertheless real and significant. 
Id. at 331, 127 P.3d at 234. 
Additionally, several other jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether 
an officer may render an expert opinion that the defendant was intoxicated, and have 
found that such testimony is improper because it invades upon the province of the jury. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in a supplementary opinion, held that permitting 
opinion testimony that the defendant was "drunk," "intoxicated," or "under the influence" 
is improper because it violates the province of the jury. Fuenning v. Superior Coult In 
and For Maricopa County, 680 P.2d 121, 136 (Ariz. 1983). As noted by the Fuenning 
court, "When, in a DWI prosecution, the officer is asked whether the defendant was 
driving while intoxicated, the witness is actually being asked his opinion of whether the 
defendant was guilty. In our view, such questions are not within the spirit of the rules." 
Id. The court in Fuenning proceeded to note that such questions give rise to the danger 
that the jury will convict or acquit based upon the evaluations of guilt provided by the 
witness rather than their own consideration of the evidence. Id.; see also State v. 
Heirera, 51 P.3d 353, 357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has likewise found error in admission of testimony 
from police officers as to a legal conclusion regarding a defendant's impairment or 
ability to safely operate a vehicle. Stafe v. Vliet, 983 P.2d 189, 197-1 98 (Haw. 1999). 
Among the reasons why the officer's testimony was deemed improper was that it 
"embraced the ultimate legal issue in the case." Id. at 198. The court in Vliet held that, 
whether by lay or expert opinion, the officer should have been limited to testifying as to 
the articulable facts which he had observed, such as the defendant's performance on 
the field sobriety test, along with other alleged indicators of intoxication such as the 
smell of alcoholic beverage on the defendant's breath and the officer's observation that 
the defendant glassy, irritated eyes. Id. 
The error in this case was not harmless. The prosecutor asked two different 
officers, over Mr. Corwin's objection, whether, based on their specialized training and 
experience, they believed that Mr. Corwin was under the influence of alcohol, unable to 
operate his vehicle, or impaired. (Part I Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.8-14; p.196, L.$5 - p.197, 
L.3.) During closing arguments, the prosecutor again emphasized the specialized 
training and experience of the law enforcement officers when the prosecutor stated: 
You've heard from both officers. Both officers, based on their training, 
based on their experience gave an opinion as to whether or not they 
believed Mr. Corwin could safely operate a motor vehicle. Officer Pittz, 
who has been an officer for years, who is a field training officer himself, 
gave his opinion. Based in my opinion I believe Mr. Corwin was too - was 
under the influence and too impaired to drive a motor vehicle. 
(Part I Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.16-24.) 
The prosecutor made similar remarks immediately following the above quoted 
passage reiterating Trooper Cabaong's conclusion that "Mr. Corwin was under the 
influence of alcohol and could not safely operate a motor vehicle," based upon the 
trooper's specialized training and experience. (Part I Trial Tr., p.313, L.25 - p.314, 
L. 10.) 
The repeated elicitation of and emphasis on this testimony, in conjunction with 
the emphasis on the officers' specialized training and experience, called upon the jury to 
defer to the opinions of these officers as to matters that were fully within the 
qualifications of the jurors to determine for themselves. As such, the admission of this 
testimony over Mr. Corwin's repeated objections violated Mr. Corwin's right to a jury trial 
and was not harmless. 
II. 
The Prosecutor's Closinq Remarks At Sentencing Reqardinq Her Personal Belief In The 
Guilt Of The Defendant Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A, Introduction 
At closing argument, the prosecutor stated a personal belief, expressly rooted in 
her own opinion, that Mr. Corwin was "under the influence and too impaired to drive a 
motor vehicle." (Part I Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.22-24.) This remark was sandwiched 
between references to the personal opinions of two law enforcement officers that 
Mr. Corwin was under the influence of alcohol, which was the central issue that the jury 
was charged with determining. In this case, given the improperly admitted testimony of 
the officers giving such an opinion, and the inherent appeal to the prestige of the 
prosecutor's station when referring to the prosecutor's personal opinion as to guilt, this 
argument rose to the level of a fundamental error that deprived Mr. Corwin of his right to 
a fair trial. 
B. The Prosecutor's Closinq Remarks At Sentencinq Reaarding Her Personal Belief 
In The Guilt Of The Defendant Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Closing argument serves the important purpose of clarifying the issues presented 
to the jury for their resolution in a criminal case. State V. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 
P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). Both the prosecution and defense are afforded 
considerable latitude in closing arguments, and are entitled to discuss the evidence and 
inferences therefrom based on their respective viewpoints. Id. 
However, while both sides are given considerable latitude, this latitude is not 
unbounded. With regard to the closing remarks of the prosecutor, these remarks 
cannot properly include an expression of the personal belief or opinion of the prosecutor 
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and it constitutes misconduct for a 
prosecutor to express such an opinion. Id; State v. Garcia, 100 ldaho 108, 110-1 11, 
594 P.2d 146, 148-149 (1979). Additionally, the expression of a personal opinion as to 
the guilt or innocence of a defendant on the part of a prosecutor violates the general 
ethical duty of attorneys to refrain from stating a personal opinion as to the guilt or 
innocence of an accused. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULE 3.4(e); I.R.C.P. 
3.4(e). 
In this case, the prosecutor expressed a personal belief regarding Mr. Corwin's 
guilt, and did so based upon her personal opinion. The prosecutor stated the following 
during closing arguments: 
You've heard from both officers. Both officers, based on their training, 
based on their experience gave an opinion as to whether or not they 
believed Mr. Corwin could safely operate a motor vehicle. Officer Pittz, 
who has been an officer for years, gave his opinion. Based in my opinion I 
believe Mr. Cotwin was too - was under the influence and too impaired to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(Part I Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.16-24 (emphasis added)). 
In the absence of an objection to the misconduct at trial, this Court will only 
review a claim of prosecutoriaf misconduct for the first time on appeal if the misconduct 
constitutes fundamental error. State v. Lovelass, 133 ldaho 160, 167, 983 P.2d 233, 
240 (Ct. App. 1999). "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error 
only if the acts or comments constituting the misconduct are so egregious or 
inflammatory that any ensuing prejudice cannot be remedied by a curative jury 
instruction." Id. 
The error in this case rises to the level of a fundamental error. There is a special 
danger that inheres when a prosecutor expresses a personal belief that the defendant is 
guilty because of the prestige of the prosecutor's office, and very real possibility that 
jurors may be more likely to defer to representations of the prosecution in light of that 
prestige. It has long been recognized in ldaho that prosecutors, "are part of the 
machinery of the court, and . . . occupy an official position, which necessarily leads 
jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused." 
See State v. Irwin, 144 ldaho 82, 110, 156 P.2d 583, 611 (1903). And a fair trial, 
"certainly implies a trial in which the attorney representing the state does not throw the 
prestige of his public office, information from its records, and the expression of his own 
belief of guilt into the scales against the accused." State v. Case, 298 P.2d 500, 503 
(Wash. 1956). 
This prejudice was increased in light of the fact that the prosecutor inserted 
expressions of her own personal opinion between reiterations of the personal opinions 
of two law enforcement officers who also opined during their testimony that they 
believed that Mr. Corwin was "under the influence" or "impaired." The same danger that 
the jury will defer to a prosecutor based upon the perceived prestige or status of that 
office is also present with regard to the opinions expressed by law enforcement officers. 
As noted by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Montgomery, the testimony of 
police officers may convey to the jury an "aura of reliability" which may otherwise sway 
the minds of jurors. Montgomery, 183 P.3d 267, 276 (Wash. 2008). Through 
connecting her personal opinion as to Mr. Corwin's guilt to the previously admitted 
opinion testimony of the law enforcement officers of the same, the prosecutor was 
inextricably intertwining these opinions to convey the sense to the jury they should defer 
to these opinions as to Mr. Corwin's guilt, rather than their own evaluation. 
Additionally, because there was no testing of Mr. Corwin's blood or breath to 
establish Mr. Corwin's blood alcohol content, the State's evidence that Mr. Corwin was 
driving under the influence of alcohol was based on circumstantial evidence of 
intoxication. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, L.9 - p.194, L.4.) There was testimony that 
Mr. Corwin smelled of alcohol; had bloodshot, glassy eyes; had shaky movements; and 
was "argumentative" with police. (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, L. 12 - p.95, L. 14; p. 165, L.7 - 
p.168, L.23.) 
But there were counter-indications to some of this evidence as well. Officer Pittz 
did not detect any slurred speech and Mr. Corwin's motor skills were, in the officer's 
opinion, consistent with someone who is handcuffed. (Part I Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.15-25.) 
There was testimony that there was no way to establish how long the empty box of beer 
and beer cans in the median had been there, and therefore no way to reliably connect 
these cans to the car that Mr. Corwin was alleged to have been driving. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p.214, L . l l  - p.215, L.2; p.262, Ls.1-13.) And the arresting officer admitted that he had 
never asked Mr. Corwin how many drinks he had consumed, nor how long before being 
questioned by police Mr. Corwin had consumed alcohol. (Part I Trial Tr., p.215, L.23 - 
p.216, L.17.) Moreover, the testimony at trial indicated that Mr. Corwin violently crashed 
his car while driving at a high rate of speed, which could account for some of the 
physical shakiness or difficulties in speech that the officers observed. (Part I Trial Tr., 
p.28, L.18- p.78, L.15.) 
Additionally, the district court had already ruled that the jury could hear and 
consider the personal opinions of the officers as to Mr. Corwin's guilt. See Part I, supra. 
Through intertwining the prosecutor's own opinion of Mr. Corwin's guilt with the 
previously admitted opinions of the officers, which the district court had already decided 
to let the jury consider, it is likely that a curative instruction to disregard only the 
prosecutor's improper remarks would be of no avail. 
The evidence of Mr. Corwin's guilt was not overwhelming, and much of the 
circumstantial evidence of his intoxication presented was reasonably called into 
question through cross-examination. Moreover, the particular danger of the jury 
deferring to the personal opinion of the prosecutor has long been recognized in Idaho 
and other jurisdictions. Under the facts of this case, the ensuing prejudice resulting 
from the prosecutor's expression of her personal opinion of Mr. Corwin's guilt could not 
have been cured by an instruction from the district court. As such, the prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case rose to the level of a fundamental error that denied Mr. Corwin 
his right to a fair trial. 
111. 
The District Court Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 When It Sentenced 
Mr. Corwin Without The Benefit Of The Substance Abuse Evaluation That Was Ordered 
For Purposes Of Sentencing, And Further Abused Its Discretion When It Denied 
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 Motion That Reauested Such Evaluation Be Actuatlv Performed 
A. Introduction 
Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered that a substance abuse evaluation 
be performed on Mr. Corwin for the court's use at sentencing. However, no evaluation 
was performed and this deficiency was readily apparent both through Mr. Cowin's 
remarks to the presentence investigator and through a notation in the PSI that a 
substance abuse evaluation should be inserted. There was no other information 
contained in the PSI that constituted an evaluation of Mr. Corwin's condition or any 
recommendation for potential treatments or sentencing alternatives. In light of this plain 
deficiency, and despite the court's order finding that such evaluation was necessary in 
this case, the district court sentenced Mr. Cowin without having all of the requisite 
information that a substance abuse evaluation would provide. This constituted manifest 
disregard for I.C.R. 32(f) and I.C. $18-8005(9), which mandates that a substance abuse 
evaluation be ordered in DUI cases. 
Moreover, Mr. Corwin sought to rectifj this deficiency in sentencing information 
when he requested that a substance abuse evaluation be performed in his Rule 35 
motion. The district court, without any anaiysis or acknowledgment of this request, 
denied Mr. Corwin's motion. This denial constitutes an abuse of the district court's 
discretion. 
B. The District Court Manifestlv Disregarded I.C.R. 32 When It Sentenced 
Mr. Convin Without The Benefit Of The Substance Abuse Evaluation That Was 
Ordered For Purposes Of Sentencing 
Mr. Corwin asserts that the district court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 when it 
sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of a substance abuse evaluation to inform the 
district court's determinations at sentencing. 
At the outset, it should be noted that Mr. Corwin did not object to the lack of a 
substance abuse evaluation at ~entencing.~ (Sentencing Tr., p.4, L.15 - p.5, L.9.) 
However, this Court has recognized that a defendant may challenge the adequacy of 
the contents of the PSI for the first time on appeal where the defendant can show that 
the district court acted in manifest disregard of the requirements of I.C.R. 32. See, e.g., 
State V. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 566, 650 P.2d 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1982). Additionally, 
where statutory provisions indicate that consideration of certain types of information or 
the ordering of certain evaluations is mandatory at sentencing, sentencing of the 
defendant in absence of such an evaluation can constitute manifest disregard of the 
provisions of I.C.R. 32. See State v. Durham, - I d a h o ,  195 P.3d 723 (Ct. App. 
2008); Sfate v. Craner, 137 ldaho 188, 189-190,45 P.3d 844, 845-846 (Ct. App. 2002). 
This Court may wish to note that, while Mr. Corwin did not specifically object to the 
failure of the PSI to contain a substance abuse evaluation as was ordered in this case, 
the district court's questions regarding the contents of the PSI focused exclusively on 
whether Mr. Corwin had objections to the factual accuracy of the contents of the report, 
rather than whether Mr. Corwin had any other general objections as to the report's 
contents. (Sentencing Tr., p.4, Ls.24-25; p.5, Ls.6-8.) 
ldaho Criminal Rule 3 2 0  provides that a sentencing judge may order an 
additional investigation of the case if the judge deems it necessary, and the judge may 
further use the information obtained through this additional investigation in considering 
the disposition of the case. I.C.R. 320. While the language of Rule 320  is permissive, 
stating that the district court may order additional investigation, there are two salient 
facts that made the creation and inclusion of a substance abuse evaluation mandatory 
for purposes of sentencing in this case: (1) a substance abuse evaluation was actually 
and explicitly deemed necessary and ordered by the district court, thus making the 
generation of this report mandatory; and (2) the ldaho Legislature has determined that 
such evaluations are mandatory in DUI cases. I.C.R. 320; I.C. § 18-8005(9); (Parts I1 & 
Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.10-I 5.). 
The district court in this case, with regard to the ordering of an evaluation 
regarding Mr. Cowin's alcohol abuse and potential addiction, stated that, "I think that 
would be required. I will order an alcohol evaluation to be prepared." (Parts II & Ill Trial 
Tr., p.43, Ls.13-15.) The district court also entered its order for the substance abuse 
evaluation within its Notice of Order for Presentence Report. (R., p.105.) 
Additionally, under I.C. 3 18-8005(9), when a defendant has been found guilty of 
the provisions of I.C. 3 18-8004, that defendant is required to undergo an alcohol 
evaluation prior to the date of sentencing. I.C. 18-8005(9). This statutory provision 
provides for only two exceptions that would permit the district court to proceed to 
sentencing in absence of such a report. First, the requirement for an evaluation may be 
waived if the defendant has no other prior or pending DUI convictions and the court has 
information from other reliable sources indicating that the defendant does not regularly 
abuse alcohol or drugs. I.C. Ij 18-8005(9). Second, the requirement may be waived by 
the district court "if the court has a presentence investigation report, substance abuse 
assessment, criminogenic risk assessment, or other assessment which evaluates the 
defendant's degree of alcohol abuse and need for alcohol treatment conducted within 
twelve (12) months preceding the date of the defendant's sentencing." I.C. 3 18- 
8005(9). Neither exception applies under the record in this case. 
Moreover, the PSI affirmatively indicated both the absence of, and the need for, 
this evaluation. Mr. Corwin reported to the presentence investigator that he was an 
alcoholic and a drug addict. (PSI, p.12.) He expressed that he was willing to 
successfully participate in any treatment program ordered by the district court. (PSI, 
p.?3.) Mr. Corwin also noted to the investigator that "he never underwent a drug/alcohol 
evaluation as requested on the PSI order." (PSI, p.13.) Under the section entitled 
"Treatment Programs AndlOr Optional Recommendations," the investigator's sole 
recommendation was "Incarceration under the custody of the ldaho State Board of 
Correction." (PSI, p.15.) 
Finally, the clearest indication to the district court that the sentencing information 
contained within the PSI was plainly inadequate in light of the requirements of I.C. Ij 18- 
8005(9) and I.C.R. 32(f) was the following line contained at the conclusion of the PSI: 
"INSERT DRUG AND ALCOHOL EVALUATION." (PSI, p.15.) 
Finally, this error was not harmless because the district court received no 
information regarding appropriate treatments that may be available to Mr. Corwin and 
recommended no drug or alcohol treatments during his incarceration as part of 
Mr. Corwin's sentence. (Sentencing Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.17, L.2.) ldaho Code 18-8005(9) 
provides that the district court "shall take the evaluation into consideration in 
determining an appropriate sentence." I.C. § 18-8005(9). The district court failed to 
abide by the clear directives of the Legislature when it sentenced Mr. Corwin without the 
benefit of this report. This failure occurred despite the district court's acknowledgment 
that Mr. Corwin did "have significant drug and alcohol issues." (Sentencing Tr., p.13, 
Ls.14-15.) As such, the district court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 when it 
sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of the substance abuse evaluation that was 
ordered and statutorily required in this case. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Corwin's Request, 
Pursuant To His Rule 35 Motion. That The District Court Actually Order The 
Substance Abuse Evaluation To Be Performed 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. Stafe v. Trent, 
125 ldaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 ldaho 
21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App.1987), and Sfate v. Lopez, 106 ldaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 
(Ct. App. 1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 ldaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If the sentence was 
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 ldaho 114, 822 P.2d 101 1 (Ct. App. 1991). 
While most requests for leniency pursuant to Rule 35 motions contest only the 
length of the defendant's sentence, the manner in which the sentence is imposed can 
also be examined in the context of a Rule 35 motion. Sfafe v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 
822-825, 186 P.3d 676, 678-681 (Ct. App. 2008). This can include issues regarding the 
failure of the district court to acquire necessary evaluations to be used for purposes of 
sentencing. Id. 
As a component of his request for a reduction of his sentence, Mr. Corwin, in his 
pro se Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentence, implicitly asked for a substance 
abuse evaluation because the information provided in such an evaluation, "would 
mitigate defendant's sentence." (R., p.127.) He later reiterated his belief that he 
suffered from alcoholism, and asserted that he had asked the presentence investigator 
in his case for a substance abuse evaluation. (R., p.129.) 
Despite Mr. Corwin's request, the district court's order on his Rule 35 motion fails 
to even acknowledge the absence of a substance abuse/alcohol evaluation in this case. 
(R., pp.135-137.) The district court's order only acknowledges the grounds raised by 
Mr. Corwin as, "1) rehabilitation, 2) the PSI contained errors related to the number of the 
defendant's prior felonies, and 3) the sentence is unduly severe as the defendant did 
not injure anyone in relation to this crime." (R., p.135.) 
Mr. Corwin brought the district court's attention to the failure to acquire the 
substance abuse evaluation that was mandated under the facts of this case. The 
district court did not acknowledge, much less respond, to this issue. As such, the 
district court also abused its discretion when it failed to order a substance abuse 
evaluation be performed for reconsideration of Mr. Corwin's sentence pursuant to 
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Corwin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence and remand this case for a new trial. In the alternative. Mr. Corwin asks 
that this Court vacate the district court's sentence and remand this case to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing upon completion and submission of an appropriate 
substance abuse evaluation. 
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